




**NORTH KOREAN, CHINESE, AND SOVIET REACTIONS TO
EXERCISE TEAM SPIRIT, 1983-85**

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
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PREFACE

This study examines the reactions of North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union to Exercise TEAM SPIRIT during 1983, 1984, and 1985. Statements by leaders and press coverage have been reviewed to determine the extent to which each of the three nations views TEAM SPIRIT as a threat to its national interests and to the Asia-Pacific region. The study includes a prognosis of reactions to TEAM SPIRIT in 1986.

Cathleen A. Campbell, Donald R. DeGlopper and Elizabeth E. Green provided professional opinions and research contributing to the production of this study.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
1. INTRODUCTION	1
a. Historical Overview of TEAM SPIRIT	1
b. The Political Significance of TEAM SPIRIT in Northeast Asia	1
2. NORTH KOREA	1
a. Overview	1
b. Official Statements Critical of TEAM SPIRIT	2
c. Media Coverage of TEAM SPIRIT	3
3. CHINA	4
a. Overview	4
b. Official Statements Critical of TEAM SPIRIT	5
c. Media Coverage of TEAM SPIRIT	5
4. SOVIET UNION	6
a. Overview	6
b. Official Statements Critical of TEAM SPIRIT	7
c. Media Coverage of TEAM SPIRIT	8
5. PROGNOSIS OF REACTIONS TO TEAM SPIRIT IN 1986	9
NOTES	11

APPENDIX

North Korean, Chinese, and Soviet Reactions to TEAM SPIRIT, 1983-85	13
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SUMMARY

North Korea and the Soviet Union publicized similar threat perceptions of Exercise TEAM SPIRIT throughout the 1983-85 period. Both nations accused the United States of using the exercise to prepare for offensive military actions against the Socialist nations of Asia. Pyongyang publicly maintained and Moscow implied that South Korean and Japanese involvement in TEAM SPIRIT indicates that these two nations would support a US invasion of North Korea. Ever since North Korean President Kim Il-song visited Moscow in May 1984, Soviet leaders have mentioned TEAM SPIRIT in statements which have implied that the Soviet Union plans to expand its military cooperation with North Korea. China has opposed TEAM SPIRIT because the exercise is viewed as detrimental to its efforts to promote a dialog for peace between Seoul and Pyongyang. China has not appeared to view TEAM SPIRIT as a threat to any nation in Asia, with the possible exception of North Korea. Additionally, China has stopped referring to South Korea as a client of the United States, and Japan is never mentioned in Chinese press coverage of TEAM SPIRIT.

Opposition to TEAM SPIRIT is an integral part of North Korea's foreign policies concerning the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States. North Korea views the exercise as one part of the US-ROK plan to perpetuate the division of the Korean peninsula and sees both the size and scope of training as threats. In 1983, Pyongyang reacted to TEAM SPIRIT by placing its armed forces on a "semi-war" footing, and by organizing a media campaign for the purpose of encouraging domestic and international opposition to the exercise. In 1984, North Korea's propaganda campaign included calls for the United States to negotiate with it to replace the 1953 armistice agreement with a peace agreement. Although South Korea would participate in these talks, the wording of the proposal indicated that Pyongyang did not intend for Seoul to be an equal partner in the discussions. In 1985, North Korea changed its tactics again and postponed on-going inter-Korean talks, saying it could not carry on a dialog during TEAM SPIRIT. Throughout the period, North Korea hoped its actions would enhance its longterm goal of promoting the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea.

China opposed TEAM SPIRIT in each of the 3 years under study; however, it did not organize a media campaign on the scale of the campaigns of the Soviets and North Koreans. The Chinese seemed most concerned about the size of the exercise. It appears that although the Chinese supported a US military presence in the region to provide a counterweight to Soviet military expansion, they regarded TEAM SPIRIT as detrimental to peace on the Korean peninsula. In 1985, China supported North Korea's postponement of the inter-Korean talks during TEAM SPIRIT. Chinese leaders may be afraid that TEAM SPIRIT will influence the North Koreans to end talks with South Korea and return to a more militant foreign policy line.

Both the size and content of the training in TEAM SPIRIT are viewed as threats by the Soviet Union. In each of the 3 years under study, Moscow organized a propaganda campaign in which it stressed the following points: the United States is using South Korea as a bridgehead for aggression against North Korea and other Socialist nations in the region; the United States is planning to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, and possibly, against the Soviet Union; Japan's support for and "participation" in TEAM SPIRIT is a

threat; South Korea is a pliable client of the United States. It is possible that increases in Soviet military support for North Korea in recent months have been influenced by TEAM SPIRIT. Since North Korean President Kim Il-song visited Moscow in May 1984, Soviet leaders have mentioned TEAM SPIRIT in statements which have implied a Soviet intention to expand military cooperation with North Korea.

In 1986, North Korea is likely to follow the precedent set in 1985 and demand the cancellation of TEAM SPIRIT as a precondition for holding inter-Korean talks during the period from January to May. The possibility of North Korea's initiating some type of military action against South Korea or the United States during TEAM SPIRIT should not be discounted as long as the North Koreans continue to question the legitimacy of the ROK Government and call for the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. North Korea and the Soviet Union may arrange for a bilateral political or military exchange to coincide with TEAM SPIRIT to stress the commonality of their threat perceptions. The Soviet reaction will, undoubtedly, include its annual propaganda campaign. China will probably oppose TEAM SPIRIT again in 1986; however, China has not regarded the exercise as a direct threat in the past and it is unlikely it will change this perception in 1986.

1. INTRODUCTION

a. Historical Overview of TEAM SPIRIT

TEAM SPIRIT is a joint military exercise held annually in Korea to promote the combat readiness of US and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces and to test the capability of the United States to deploy troops and equipment to Korea from the United States and its bases in the Pacific region in the event of another Korean War. The exercise provides US commanders and their units with a valuable training experience and familiarizes them with the Korean terrain. Since its inception in 1976, TEAM SPIRIT has contributed greatly to the interoperability of the armed forces of the two nations. It provides a signal to North Korea and other countries in the region that the United States is prepared to honor its commitments to the ROK under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty and subsequent military agreements.

b. The Political Significance of TEAM SPIRIT in Northeast Asia

In 1985, the North Koreans made TEAM SPIRIT an issue in the current inter-Korean dialog by refusing to hold scheduled Red Cross and economic talks in January unless the United States and South Korea agreed to cancel the exercise. Since the entire region stands to benefit if the inter-Korean talks do lead to cooperation between the two antagonists, or at least to a reduction of their ongoing political and military competition, it is important to evaluate the reasons for Pyongyang's action.

Although China criticized TEAM SPIRIT in each of the 3 years under study, it has maintained a relatively low profile on the issue. The Chinese are trying to promote the inter-Korean dialog because they believe these talks are the key to maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula. Their opposition to TEAM SPIRIT in 1985 was based on the acceptance of North Korea's argument that the holding of a military exercise is not conducive to broadening the levels of trust between North and South Korea. While they oppose TEAM SPIRIT, it is distinctly possible that Chinese leaders support the US military presence in South Korea and throughout the Pacific region because it has provided a counterweight to Soviet military power.

Recent Soviet moves to upgrade the significance of North Korea in their strategic military planning appear to have been influenced to some extent by TEAM SPIRIT. During each of the 3 years under study they organized a large media campaign in which TEAM SPIRIT was criticized as a threat to the Soviet Union.

2. NORTH KOREA

a. Overview

Opposition to TEAM SPIRIT is an integral part of North Korean foreign policy because the US military commitment to South Korea is considered to be the biggest obstacle preventing reunification, and the size and visibility of the exercise make it a good propaganda target. North Korean leaders, arguing that TEAM SPIRIT is a "preliminary war" that could ignite into a real conflict

"at any moment," use the exercise as a pretext for heightening defense preparedness.

In each of the years under study, the North Korean Government used a different strategy to mobilize opposition to TEAM SPIRIT both at home and abroad. In 1983, the entire nation was placed on a "semi-war" footing as North Korean leaders and the media maintained that the unprecedented size and offensive nature of the exercise required the country to take precautions. In 1984, the Government stressed its efforts to engage the United States in a peace dialog. The North Koreans claimed they would be willing to "guarantee peace" and allow the United States to withdraw its troops from South Korea "without losing face." Although the North Koreans proposed tripartite talks which would include the South Koreans as the third party, the language used in the proposal made it clear that Seoul was included simply to encourage US participation. In 1985, however, North Korea changed tactics again and focused attention on South Korea's role in the exercise. North Korean Vice Premier Kim Hwan tried to arrange a meeting with South Korean Deputy Prime Minister Sin Pyong-hyon to discuss his government's reasons for postponing the talks until TEAM SPIRIT was over. It is clear that one of the reasons for Pyongyang's intense efforts to promote talks with the United States, South Korea, or both, is to bring about the dissolution of the US-ROK security relationship and the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea.

b. Official Statements Critical of TEAM SPIRIT

In 1983, remarks by North Korean leaders critical of TEAM SPIRIT were limited to discussing North Korea's threat perception of the exercises. Since 1984, these statements have always included demands that the United States and South Korea hold talks. Additionally, the North Koreans appeared to be showing more respect for South Korean leaders, perhaps hoping that this action will help to overcome the reluctance of US and South Korean leaders to participate in talks concerning military matters.

The speech that seems to have been the first to reflect the new approach was delivered by Ho Tam to delegates attending the January 1984 session of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA). Ho, a member of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) Political Bureau and Chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, claimed that TEAM SPIRIT 83 was so large, and involved the use of such dangerous weaponry, that North Korea had no choice but to place its own armed forces on alert. Ho argued that plans to increase the size of the exercise would make the situation even more tense in 1984. He described the ROK Government and the ROK Army as being completely under the control of the United States. He further claimed that both South Korea and Japan are part of a trilateral military alliance with the United States and are willing participants in a US-directed plan to dominate Asia through intimidation and, possibly, military actions. After he assured his audience that North Korea had no intention of invading the South, criticized the United States for continuing a policy of confrontation, and accused the South Korean Government of turning its back on the desire of all Koreans to achieve peaceful reunification while it promoted American military interests, Ho talked about North Korea's new proposal for tripartite talks. He candidly acknowledged that North Korea proposed the talks for the purpose of signing a bilateral agreement with the United States that will end the need for any US

military forces to stay in South Korea. Ho argued that once a peace agreement was signed, and the United States withdrew all its military forces from South Korea, tension on the Korean peninsula would decrease, and his Government could enter into a sincere dialog with the South Korean Government to bring about reunification. Ho concluded by calling on the United States to accept the tripartite talks proposal.¹

The North Koreans were quick to react to the 4 January 1985 US-ROK announcement that TEAM SPIRIT 85 would begin on 1 February. A KCNA broadcast on 7 January provided the first sign that the North Korean Government planned to postpone the inter-Korean talks to protest TEAM SPIRIT. On 10 January, Ho Tam delivered a radio address to the North Korean people for the purpose of explaining why the North Korean Government was taking this action. Ho called TEAM SPIRIT "an insult to our proposal for peace negotiations and a challenge to dialog and peace."² The formal announcement of the North Korean Government's decision to postpone the inter-Korean talks came in a 16 January statement attributed to Vice Premier Kim Hwan. In the statement, Kim emphasized that he had telephoned a "South Korean Deputy Prime Minister" on 9 January to arrange face-to-face talks to discuss the North Korean demand that TEAM SPIRIT be cancelled so that the inter-Korean talks on economic cooperation could go ahead as scheduled on 17 January. He then criticized the South Korean Government for participating in TEAM SPIRIT, obstructing the on-going dialog, and refusing to agree to his proposal to hold talks with his South Korean counterpart to discuss the issue.³ The purpose of this statement was to show that the North Korean Government had made an effort to prevent a rupture of the dialog and to stress that North Korea considered it impossible to continue talks while the United States and South Korea are conducting joint military exercises in Korea.

c. Media Coverage of TEAM SPIRIT

The North Korean media provided extensive coverage of TEAM SPIRIT, coverage which started before the annual exercises began in February and continued even after they ended in April. The content of the coverage has changed little in recent years. (See appendix.) The North Koreans attempted to identify all of the US military units that are deployed to Korea from the United States and from US bases in Japan and elsewhere in the Pacific. They expressed concern that offensive operations were practiced with the ROK Army, including tactical nuclear weapons training, and that much of the training occurred in the vicinity of the military demarcation line. They were critical of South Korea for participating in military exercises which they claimed were part of a US plan to intimidate not only North Korea, but other Socialist countries in the region. Pyongyang claimed that Tokyo was an active participant in TEAM SPIRIT and portrayed Japan's military policies under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone as designed to reestablish a Japanese empire in Asia. The North Koreans also used the media to assure their own population that the North Korean Armed Forces were prepared to defend the country and to mobilize domestic and international support for Pyongyang's position.

3. CHINA

a. Overview

Chinese press coverage of TEAM SPIRIT during the 1983-85 period indicated that there were two reasons for China's opposition to the exercise. First, the Chinese believed that TEAM SPIRIT increased tension on the Korean peninsula. In this regard, they seemed more concerned with the size of the exercise than with its purpose. Second, China supported North Korea's position that it cannot participate in inter-Korean talks while the United States and South Korea are conducting a joint military exercise in the South. Because Chinese leaders and the Chinese press were cautious about expressing criticism of the US military presence in Asia and the Pacific, how China's opposition to TEAM SPIRIT relates to China's overall position on the US military presence in the region is of interest.

Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, China has attempted to develop pragmatic approaches to international problems. In its policies on Korea, China has tried to balance its traditionally friendly relations with North Korea with its desire to improve relations with the United States and to use its influence to promote a reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula. Currently, China appears to be using its influence in Pyongyang to discourage military adventurism, including acts of terrorism, and to encourage North Korean leaders to participate in a peaceful dialog with their South Korean counterparts to promote cooperation between the two sides in reducing tension.

That China believes an inter-Korean dialog is necessary to promote not only peace on the Korean peninsula, but also stability in Asia and the Pacific, is reflected in the statements of Chinese leaders and selected articles in Chinese journals. In May 1984, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang said:

We fully agree with the stance of Comrade Kim Il-song and the Workers' Party of Korea: the general goal--an independent and peaceful reunification; the principle--reunification in the form of confederation; and the means--negotiations.

Hu also expressed support for the tripartite talks proposal and called for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea.⁴ An authoritative February 1984 article argued that North Korea wanted peace with the United States and South Korea and suggested that the United States was obstructing Korea's peaceful reunification with its "two Koreas" policy. The article also claimed TEAM SPIRIT was unnecessary because North Korea had no intention of invading South Korea.⁵ Finally, a December 1984 issue of Liaowang [Outlook] expressed concern over the postponement of the second round of the inter-Korean economic talks. North Korea postponed the talks because of a shooting incident in the joint security area of Panmunjom on 23 November when a Soviet tourist defected to South Korea. Liaowang called for the continuation of the talks, saying:

In spite of the ups and downs in the North-South Korea relations, what the entire Korean nation needs is reconciliation, dialog, and reunification. Historical

experience shows that the affairs of the Korean peninsula should not be handled in haste, but in a calm way and that, at present, those in the international community who are concerned with and support the two sides of Korea in holding dialogs and improving their relations constitute a majority.⁶

Articles in the Chinese media on the issue of global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union usually attempt to present factual and impartial assessments of the military balance between the superpowers. With the expansion of US military forces in Asia and the Pacific in recent years, the Chinese seem to believe that a military balance between US and Soviet forces has been achieved. Concurrently, they appear to be less concerned with the Soviet military threat to their interests and more optimistic about the prospects for peace in the region.⁷ However, the Chinese also argue that the United States must act responsibly, respect the sovereignty of Asian nations, and strive to end its global competition with the Soviet Union. On the last point, Premier Zhao Ziyang in a January 1984 interview declared: "Such acts as forcibly occupying the territories of other countries, infringing upon their sovereignty, and interfering in their internal affairs must be stopped."⁸ Zhao specifically mentioned having military bases in a foreign country as being one kind of "interference."

China's assessment of the global military balance and its desire to promote peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas influence its position on the US-ROK military relationship. In view of the current international situation and the growth of Soviet military power in Asia and the Pacific, it is possible that Chinese leaders privately support the stationing of US troops in South Korea while they publicly oppose it. Eventually, China wants to see a peaceful change in the status quo on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, it is likely that Chinese leaders are sincere when they express support for tripartite and inter-Korean talks. The Chinese oppose TEAM SPIRIT because they believe it is detrimental to the peace process. In the long term, China hopes to encourage a diminution of Soviet and US military influence in Asia.

b. Official Statements Critical of TEAM SPIRIT

Over the 3-year period, official comment on TEAM SPIRIT was limited to one official statement per year delivered by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman. In 1983, the exercise was called a threat to peace and the Ministry called on the United States and South Korea to end the exercise immediately.⁹ In 1984, the spokesman said that China was opposed to TEAM SPIRIT because it increased tension on the Korean peninsula.¹⁰ In 1985, China expressed support for North Korea's postponement of the economic and Red Cross talks unless the United States and South Korea agreed to cancel TEAM SPIRIT.¹¹ The Chinese reluctance to comment on TEAM SPIRIT can probably be attributed to the importance it places on its relationship with the United States.

c. Media Coverage of TEAM SPIRIT

Chinese press coverage of TEAM SPIRIT was not extensive, with most of the coverage occurring in early February each year when the exercise was just getting under way. The Chinese were more critical of the exercise in 1983 and

1985 than they were in 1984. (See Appendix.) This trend can probably be attributed to Chinese displeasure with North Korea concerning the October 1983 assassination attempt on South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan. Since 1984 the Chinese have toned down statements that are derogatory toward both the United States and South Korea. For example, in 1983 a Chinese domestic radio broadcast referred to South Korea as US puppet, an accusation that was not repeated in 1984 and 1985. The same broadcast termed the decision to hold the exercise "presumptuous" and "stupid."¹² In 1984, Chinese reports did little more than cite North Korean sources.

The contrast between Chinese broadcasts to Korea in 1983 and 1984 is particularly notable. In 1983, the Chinese discussed the number of US troops and the military equipment deployed to Korea, accused the United States of being a nuclear threat to North Korea, supported the semi-war alert in North Korea, and called for an immediate end to the exercise.¹³ In 1984, a similar broadcast merely noted that the exercise would be the largest ever and cited Nodong Sinmun demands calling for the United States to stop the exercise and withdraw from Korea.¹⁴

In 1985, Renmin Ribao, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, reported on TEAM SPIRIT, the only such report picked up during the 3-year period. While not saying that the size of the exercise was a threat to peace, the report drew attention to the fact that the first TEAM SPIRIT in 1976 involved 46,000 troops and lasted 10 days, whereas, TEAM SPIRIT 85 would involve 200,000 troops and last one and a half months.¹⁵ The fact that this report was given prominent coverage in the Party newspaper indicated Chinese leaders' concern that TEAM SPIRIT could jeopardize the inter-Korean dialog.

Chinese reports excluded many of the themes which were common in both the North Korean and Soviet media. There was no mention of Japanese involvement in TEAM SPIRIT. The reports also did not imply that the United States conducted the exercise to intimidate nations in the region other than North Korea. At no time did the Chinese media view TEAM SPIRIT as a direct threat to China.

4. SOVIET UNION

a. Overview

TEAM SPIRIT was viewed by the Soviets as one part of the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Discussions in the media were propagandistic and provided little information about Soviet political and military objectives in the region. Soviet commentaries on TEAM SPIRIT generally placed little emphasis on North Korea's security concerns, although these concerns were usually included somewhere in the discussion. Although the Soviets expressed support for North Korea's foreign policies vis-a-vis South Korea and the United States, the Soviets did not appear to share China's interest in promoting the inter-Korean dialog.

The Soviets attempted to identify the US military units being deployed to Korea for the exercise. They also claimed that the expansion of TEAM SPIRIT in recent years made it a more formidable threat to Soviet interests. They said that the United States was prepared to use nuclear weapons against

North Korea, and possibly, against the Soviet Union. When mentioning Japan, the Soviets criticized use of Japanese bases to support TEAM SPIRIT and suggested that Japanese foreign policy was controlled by the United States. Quite often the Soviets began to discuss TEAM SPIRIT, but digressed to issues such as Japan's policy on patrolling the sea lanes or US military aid to South Korea.

Moscow appeared to view TEAM SPIRIT as one part of a growing threat to the Soviet Union and to pro-Soviet states in Asia. The Soviets stated that if TEAM SPIRIT incited a military incident with North Korea, the incident would likely develop into a full-scale war, and although they were not explicit about committing forces to such a war, they indicated that they would protect their security interests and those of their allies. The Soviets were pleased that Pyongyang had increased its support for many Soviet foreign policies since Kim Il-song's visit to Moscow in May 1984. That North Korean leaders are more open than in the past to allowing a Soviet military presence in their country is no longer in doubt; the only points in question now concern the size and scope of the Soviet commitment.

b. Statements by Soviet Officials Critical of TEAM SPIRIT

In May 1984, Kim Il-song made his first official visit to the Soviet Union since 1961. In his welcoming speech for Kim, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Secretary General Konstantin Chernenko first called on North Korea to increase cooperation with the Soviet Union, then turned his attention to security issues. Chernenko blamed the United States for causing the division of the Korean peninsula and contributing to a revival of militarism in Japan. He said that the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Pacific by the United States, and the stationing of US troops in South Korea posed a direct threat to the Soviet Union. Referring indirectly to TEAM SPIRIT, Chernenko said that "shows of American military might, which have been growing in scope with every passing year" were taken seriously by the Soviet Union. His implicit offer to increase military cooperation with North Korea came in his closing remarks. Chernenko said, "We will be able to defend our historic accomplishments, our state interests, as well as the interests and security of our allies. No one should have any doubts about that."¹⁶

However, Kim Il-song's 1984 visit to Moscow did not bring an immediate end to strained relations between the two countries. After all, Pyongyang had favored China throughout much of the late 1970s and early 1980s, opposed the invasion of Afghanistan, and supported military resistance to the Soviet-backed Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. That North Korea was not represented at a meeting of pro-Soviet states held in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, in October 1983 to coordinate the foreign policies of Socialist states indicates that it remained uncommitted to the Soviet line at that time.

For about a year following Kim's visit, the Soviets and Koreans negotiated behind the scenes to structure their relationship in such a way that Kim Il-song could claim to have kept his nonaligned status, and the Soviets could claim that North Korea had altered its independent foreign policy enough to overcome their objections. These negotiations culminated in the signing of a joint communique in April 1985, the first Soviet-North Korean joint communique since 1980. The communique announced the signing of new border and

consular agreements and advocated the broadening of foreign policy and other forms of cooperation between the two countries. As in Chernenko's speech in 1984, security issues received the most attention in this communique. The communique referred specifically to TEAM SPIRIT as one part of a North Korean-Soviet threat perception, stating,

The sides believe that a direct threat is posed to all states in the region by the maintenance and buildup of the US military presence in South Korea and the holding of US-South Korean military maneuvers on and around the Korean peninsula--maneuvers which increase in scale year after year--in conjunction with the activation of US militarist activity in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.¹⁷

Once again, the Soviets implied that they would increase military assistance to North Korea by including a statement that both nations would honor their obligations under the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance to support the other in "foiling the aggressive intrigues of the imperialist and revanchist forces in [the Asia-Pacific] region."¹⁸ The communique was signed in Moscow by North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

In August 1985, North Korea celebrated the 40th anniversary of the country's liberation from Japan. Pyongyang used the occasion to publicly demonstrate its appreciation of the Soviet Army's role in that liberation and to signal its desire to promote closer bilateral relations. Head of the CPSU delegation to the celebrations Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers G. A. Aliyev delivered a speech in Pyongyang in which he said that North Korea and the Soviet Union were involved in close collaboration to ensure security in the Far East. Aliyev called the Soviet-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance "an important factor of peace and security in the Far East and the entire Pacific region."¹⁹ Although Aliyev did not mention TEAM SPIRIT, he criticized the United States as the main source of tension in Asia.

c. Media Coverage of TEAM SPIRIT

Soviet media coverage of each TEAM SPIRIT exercise began in January and did not end until the exercise concluded. Additionally, the Soviets made references to TEAM SPIRIT throughout the year as part of their propaganda criticizing US military activities worldwide. During the reporting period, extensive coverage occurred in Izvestiya, the official newspaper of the Soviet Government, and Kraznaya Zvezda, the official newspaper of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Pravda, the official CPSU newspaper and other Soviet newspapers provided occasional coverage of TEAM SPIRIT. TASS, the official news agency, commented frequently on the exercise while it was underway. Soviet domestic television and radio broadcasts to Korea were also noted the exercise. Far Eastern Affairs, published by the Institute of the Far East of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the most authoritative academic journal devoted to the discussion of Asian issues sometimes, mentioned TEAM SPIRIT.

The content of Soviet media coverage of TEAM SPIRIT changed very little during the reporting period. Most articles provided information about the size and types of US forces involved in the exercise and discussed various aspects of the training which were viewed as a threat to Soviet interests. For example, a February 1983 article in Pravda criticized the use of bases in Japan to support the exercises and registered concern over the possibility that Japan might be willing to participate in TEAM SPIRIT in a trilateral effort to block the egress of Soviet naval vessels which must pass through the Sea of Japan on their way to the Pacific.²⁰ A 1984 Krasnaya Zvezda article focused on the nuclear weapons deployed in and around Korea during TEAM SPIRIT. While admitting that the only nuclear weapons deployed by the United States in South Korea and Japan were tactical, it reported that the United States was planning to deploy Pershing II and "long-range ground-launched cruise missiles" in both countries.²¹ Throughout the period the Soviets called TEAM SPIRIT provocative and referred to South Korea as the "puppet of the United States." The following statement from a 1985 Izvestiya article exemplified such comments:

The provocations by the American military and their puppets in direct proximity to the DPRK's borders are fraught with the emergence of an armed conflict, which would escalate into more serious international complications. So far the self-restraint and the high fighting spirit of the DPRK people and their Army are preventing the dangerous escalation of events on the Korean peninsula. But the provocations by the South are becoming increasingly brazen.²²

5. PROGNOSIS OF REACTIONS TO TEAM SPIRIT IN 1986

It is very likely that North Korea will follow the precedent established in 1985 and call for the cancellation of TEAM SPIRIT as a condition for continuing the inter-Korean dialog. Whether the United States decreases or increases the size of the exercise will probably not influence a North Korean decision on this issue for the following reasons: North Korea insisted on a cancellation of the exercise in 1985 and this demand was not represented as negotiable; and since North Korea's foreign policy seeks the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea, this issue has considerable propaganda value.

There is a possibility that North Korea and the Soviet Union will arrange for some type of political or military event to coincide with TEAM SPIRIT in order to publicize the commonality of their threat perception. A high-ranking Soviet official could visit North Korea--Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnaze, for example--or the Soviets could send a military delegation. However, North Korean opposition to Soviet military activities in Afghanistan and elsewhere would seem to preclude Pyongyang's interest in staging joint military exercises.

The possibility that North Korea will initiate military action during TEAM SPIRIT should not be discounted. Although South Korean and US forces maintain a high state of readiness throughout the exercise, North Korea could choose its target and limit the scope of its action to suit its purpose. Because it is unlikely that Pyongyang is prepared to accept the status quo on the Korean

peninsula, and because it always endeavors to focus world attention on the US military presence in the South, there is a chance that it will choose the military option. It is unlikely, however, that either China or the Soviet Union will support or assist such an action.

China's response to TEAM SPIRIT will be influenced by a number of factors. China must be concerned about its own influence in Pyongyang, given the recent increase of Soviet influence there. Also, China views the successful development of the inter-Korean talks as an issue of importance to its own security. Both North Korea and the Soviet Union appear to question China's commitment to the Socialist community, not surprising given Beijing's apparent approval of the use of US forces in Asia and the Pacific to provide a counterweight to Soviet military forces in the region. Because of its delicate diplomatic position, it is likely that China will continue to maintain a low profile on TEAM SPIRIT. The Chinese will view a reduction in the size and scope of the exercise as an action beneficial to the peace process, and they will view a larger TEAM SPIRIT as destabilizing and regrettable.

The Soviet reaction to TEAM SPIRIT will include its annual propaganda campaign. Given the improvement of Soviet-Korean political relations and the increase in Soviet military assistance to North Korea in the past year, it is likely that Moscow will place more emphasis on this cooperation in its propaganda. Moreover, the Soviets will continue to use TEAM SPIRIT to discuss unrelated issues such as the military policies of Japan. Finally, it is unlikely that the Soviets will show more respect for South Korea or pay much attention to a US decision to decrease the size of the exercise. A decision to increase the size of the exercise will be used to show that the US "threat" to the Soviet Union is growing.

NOTES

¹Korean Central News Agency, 26 January 1984, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific (hereafter FBIS/Asia and Pacific), 26 January 1984, pp. D2-14.

²Pyongyang Domestic Service, 10 January 1985, in FBIS/Asia and Pacific, 11 January 1985, pp. D1-3.

³Pyongyang Domestic Service, 16 January 1985, in FBIS/Asia and Pacific, 16 January 1985, pp. D1-2.

⁴Xinhua, 12 May 1984, in FBIS/China, 14 May 1984, pp. D6-8.

⁵Tao Bingwei, "A Look at the Korean Question," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [Journal of International Studies] (Beijing), February 1984, pp. 18-21.

⁶Li Tu, "Relaxation, Dialogue, and Hope--Developments in Relations Between North and South Korea." Liaowang [Outlook], 24 December 1984, in FBIS/China, 29 January 1985, pp. D1-3.

⁷Shi Wuqing, "Superpowers Reach Military Balance." Beijing Review, 21 January 1984, pp. 14-15 and continued 28 January 1984, pp. 25-27; Xi Linsheng, "United States: Shifts in its Asia-Pacific Policy." Beijing Review, 16 April 1985, pp. 12-13; Jin Junhui, "Reagan's Diplomacy: An Overview," Beijing Review, 17 June 1984, pp. 21-25.

⁸"Premier Zhao on Sino-US Relations and World Situation." Beijing Review, 23 January 1984, pp. 18-24.

⁹Xinhua, 7 February 1983, in FBIS/China, 7 February 1983, p. D1.

¹⁰Xinhua, 8 February 1984, in FBIS/China, 8 February 1984, p. D3.

¹¹Xinhua, 9 January 1985, in FBIS/China, 9 January 1985, pp. D3-4.

¹²Beijing Domestic Service, 2 February 1983, in FBIS/China, 3 February 1983, p. D1.

¹³Chinese radio broadcast to Korea, 1 April 1983, in FBIS/China, 5 April 1983, pp. D3-4.

¹⁴Beijing radio broadcast to Korea, 2 February 1984, in FBIS/China, 3 February 1984, p. D6.

¹⁵Liu Zhengxue and Feng Ziyuan, "They Should Bury the Hatchet and Work for Peace," Renmin Ribao [People's Daily] (Beijing), 6 February 1985, in FBIS/China, 6 February 1985, pp. D1-2.

¹⁶Korean Central News Agency, 24 May 1984, in FBIS/Asia and Pacific, 24 May 1984, pp. D7-9.

¹⁷Pravda, 25 April 1985, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 26 April 1985, pp. C1-3.

¹⁸FBIS, 26 April 1985, p. C2.

¹⁹Pravda, 14 August 1985, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 16 August 1985, pp. C5-6.

²⁰Pravda, 8 February 1983, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 8 February 1983, p. C3.

²¹Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 25 March 1984, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 29 March 1984, pp. C6-8.

²²Izvestiya, 19 February 1985, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 25 February 1985, pp. C1-2.

Appendix

North Korean, Chinese and Soviet Reactions to TEAM SPIRIT, 1983-85

<u>THREAT PERCEPTION</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
TEAM SPIRIT is a threat to North Korea	xyz	xyz	xyz
TEAM SPIRIT is a threat to stability in Asia and the Pacific	xyz	xyz	xyz
TEAM SPIRIT is a threat to all Socialist nations in Asia	xz	xz	xz
TEAM SPIRIT is a threat to the Soviet Union	x	x	x
TEAM SPIRIT is a threat to China	NA	NA	NA
<u>WHY TEAM SPIRIT THREATENS NORTH KOREA</u>			
Deployment of US forces to South Korea promotes tension between North and South Korea	xyz	xyz	xyz
TEAM SPIRIT is too large	xyz	xyz	xyz
US planning to use nuclear weapons	xyz	xz	xz
Japan's "participation" indicates it <u>might</u> decide to support an invasion of North Korea	z	xz	xz
Japan's "participation" indicates it <u>will</u> support an invasion of North Korea	z	z	z
US and South Korea <u>might</u> use TEAM SPIRIT to start a war with North Korea	xz	xz	xz
US and South Korea <u>will</u> use TEAM SPIRIT to start a war with North Korea	z	NA	NA
<u>WHY TEAM SPIRIT IS A THREAT TO PEACE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC</u>			
TEAM SPIRIT might spark a war with North Korea that would eventually involve other countries in the region	xz	xz	xz
TEAM SPIRIT obstructs the inter-Korean dialog which is an important key to the maintenance of peace in the region	NA	NA	xy

KEY: x = Soviet Union

y = China

z = North Korea

NA = Not Applicable (statement does not appear in North Korean, Chinese, or Soviet reports)